Renowned for its comprehensive, rigorous and case-rich approach, this resource trains future business leaders to analyse a wide range business issues, apply appropriate concepts and successfully implement business strategy. Strategic Management is written with practical usage in mind and is designed to suit the needs of both post-graduate and undergraduate students. The 5th edition brings the subject to life with ten brand-new in-depth case studies, covering a wide variety of Australian and international examples.
The 5th edition brings the subject to life with ten brand-new in-depth case studies, covering a wide variety of Australian and international examples.
'Researchers should find plenty of material of interest and certainly a perusal of at least the first three chapters and the concluding one should be rewarding and may well tempt one to go through the entire work.' - S. Das Gupta, Zentralblatt fur Mathematik und ihre Grenzgebiete 'In closing, allow me to shamelessly steal a Woody Allen joke which should not be a stranger to many readers of Kyklos. This is a forceful book, which is seriously written, well formatted, rich in economic applications and policy implications (to lesser extent, however), and just can not be read as fast (although great readability or light reading might be what the author takes pride to offer). One should not flip through it from cover to cover in one day and conclude: "It is about two-person repeated games with self-enforcing agreements'. Incidentally, I just reveal, in my humblest opinion, the most appropriate title of this interesting and most welcome monograph (Calling this Economic Games and Strategic Behaviour resembles renaming "Mighty Aphrodite" as "A Film by Woody Allen".' - Jong-Shin Wei, Kyklos Economic Games and Strategic Behaviour is a seminal volume which introduces a model providing solutions to economic games subject to repeated play. It develops a link between strategic bargaining and the theory of self-enforcing contracts to give insights into the long-term relationships between two parties, such as firms or governments, who meet in a negotiating situation.
This is a forceful book, which is seriously written, well formatted, rich in economic applications and policy implications (to lesser extent, however), and just can not be read as fast (although great readability or light reading might be ...
Describes the use of models and analytical techniques in support of the strategic planning process. A model of the planning process itself is presented and used to identify elements essential to an effective strategy. Incorporates a unique set of readings drawn from strategic management, strategic planning, management science and operational research literatures. Both simple and complex models are presented, and among the topics covered are: product portfolio matrices, PIMS, SWOT analysis, cognitive mapping, scenario development, risk analysis, corporate modelling, robustness analysis, plan evaluation matrices, capital investment appraisal, and the analytic hierarchy process.
Describes the use of models and analytical techniques in support of the strategic planning process.
Making, amending, and interpreting constitutions is a political game that can yield widespread suffering or secure a nation's liberty and prosperity. Given these high stakes, Robert Cooter argues that constitutional theory should trouble itself less with literary analysis and arguments over founders' intentions and focus much more on the real-world consequences of various constitutional provisions and choices. Pooling the best available theories from economics and political science, particularly those developed from game theory, Cooter's economic analysis of constitutions fundamentally recasts a field of growing interest and dramatic international importance. By uncovering the constitutional incentives that influence citizens, politicians, administrators, and judges, Cooter exposes fault lines in alternative forms of democracy: unitary versus federal states, deep administration versus many elections, parliamentary versus presidential systems, unicameral versus bicameral legislatures, common versus civil law, and liberty versus equality rights. Cooter applies an efficiency test to these alternatives, asking how far they satisfy the preferences of citizens for laws and public goods. To answer Cooter contrasts two types of democracy, which he defines as competitive government. The center of the political spectrum defeats the extremes in "median democracy," whereas representatives of all the citizens bargain over laws and public goods in "bargain democracy." Bargaining can realize all the gains from political trades, or bargaining can collapse into an unstable contest of redistribution. States plagued by instability and contests over redistribution should move towards median democracy by increasing transaction costs and reducing the power of the extremes. Specifically, promoting median versus bargain democracy involves promoting winner-take-all elections versus proportional representation, two parties versus multiple parties, referenda versus representative democracy, and special governments versus comprehensive governments. This innovative theory will have ramifications felt across national and disciplinary borders, and will be debated by a large audience, including the growing pool of economists interested in how law and politics shape economic policy, political scientists using game theory or specializing in constitutional law, and academic lawyers. The approach will also garner attention from students of political science, law, and economics, as well as policy makers working in and with new democracies where constitutions are being written and refined.
The scope of the book is simply breathtaking."--Geoffrey Garrett, Yale University "I found this book to be incredibly stimulating.